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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(4). This appeal results from a decision dated January 27, 2005, by the Honorable 
Glenn K. Iwasaki, Third Judicial District Court, which granted Appellees' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Trial Court err in concluding that, under the economic loss doctrine, 
a nonparty to a contract has no cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation under any circumstances, absent physical injury or 
property damage? 
2. Does an appraiser have an independent duty of care to persons other than 
those with whom the appraiser is in privity of contract? 
3. To what extent does an assignee have rights to sue for breach of contract? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Memorandum Decision granting Appellees' Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness. Judgment is appropriate 
only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-27. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows: 
1. On December 26, 1996, an appraisal of 2071 East Worchester Drive, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84121, was completed at the request of Dave Szumigala 
and Ellen Daley ("the Sellers"), who owned and intended to sell the 
property. The appraisal was performed by Inter-Financial, and signed by 
Andrew Schofield as Appraiser (State Certification #CG00037502) and by 
Badi Mahmood as Supervisory Appraiser. (R. at 641). 
2. On February 23, 1997, the Sellers sent a fax to the Appellees stating, "I 
hereby authorize Drew Schofield (and his firm) [Inter-Financial] to transfer 
the appraisal on 2071 East Worchester to Steve and Suzie West, Buyers of 
the subject property." (R. at 642). 
3. The Appellees admit that they performed the appraisal. (R. at 17). 
4. On February 28, 1997, the Wests closed on the purchase of the home at 
2071 East Worchester Drive, and closing documents prepared by Great 
American Mortgage indicated a charge of $150.00 for the appraisal. (R. at 
429). 
5. The appraisal contained an "Appraiser's Certification" section which 
asserts, 
7. I performed this appraisal in conformity with the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice 
that were adopted and promulgated by the Appraisal 
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Standards Board of The Appraisal Foundation and that 
were in place as of the effective date of this appraisal 
(R. at 642). 
The appraisal also contained a "Supervisory Appraiser's Certification" 
section which stated, 
If a supervisory appraiser signed the appraisal report, he or 
she certifies and agrees that: I directly supervise the appraiser 
who prepared the appraisal report, have reviewed the 
appraisal report, agree with the statements and conclusions of 
the appraiser, agree to be bound by the appraiser's 
certifications numbered 4 through 7 above, and am taking full 
responsibility for the appraisal and the appraisal report. (R. at 
642). 
The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Standards Rule 
1-1 indicates that in developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must: 
1. Be aware of, understand, and correctly employ those 
recognized methods and techniques that are necessary to 
produce a credible appraisal; 
2. Not commit a substantial error of omission or commission 
that significantly affects an appraisal; 
3. Not render appraisal services in a careless or negligent 
manner, such as a series of errors that, considered 
individually, may not significantly affect the results of an 
appraisal, but which, when considered in the aggregate, would 
be misleading. 
(emphasis added). (R. at 5). 
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8. The Appellees admitted to a contractual and a professional duty to act in 
accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice 
in performing the appraisal. (R. at 18). 
9. On or about November 23, 1997, the West's reviewed the appraisal and 
discovered many errors on the appraisal report including among others: 
A. Incorrect Square Footage Calculation On The Home - The square 
footage on the home in The Defendants's appraisal report was 
significantly higher than the actual square footage. The appraisal 
indicated a total of 2,558 finished square feet and 1,122 unfinished 
square feet. When the West's re-measured the square footage in 
November 1997, they found that the house contained 2,168 finish 
square feet. And 952 un-finished square feet. The Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office confirmed the square footage measurements of the 
Wests. The appraisal erred in improperly increasing the square 
footage by 390 finished and 170 un-finished square feet for a total of 
560 square feet error. 
B. One Comparable Property was Beyond Boundaries Identified as 
Comparable - The appraisal report relied on the prices of other 
homes in the area to determine the value of the subject property "are 
from 7200 S. to 9400 S. and from 2000 E. to 2900 E." Comparable 
#1 was further West and North of the appraisers own defined 
neighborhood boundary. 
(R. at 642-643). 
West's sought recovery from Appellees based upon contract and negligent 
misrepresentation. On February 24, 1999, Appellants filed suit in Third District 
Court. A lengthy discovery delay ensued, punctuated by the Court's award of 
certain attorney fees to Appellees (R. at 623). Motions for Entry of Judgment by 
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Default and Sanctions for Discovery Abuse were not addressed by the Court upon 
its entering of Judgment on the Pleadings for Appellees. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When Appellants learned that Appellees had negligently overstated the square 
footage of a home they had purchased by 560 square feet (18% of the size of the home), 
they sought recovery from Appellees based on the true value of the property using the 
correct square footage and correspondingly lower comparable sales of homes in the area. 
Appellees were persuasive in convincing the trial court that Appellants are barred from 
recovery under the economic loss doctrine. Appellants have distinguished Appellee's line 
of authority with the correct precedent, Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2000) 
which allows Appellants to recover when there is an independent duty of care owed by 
professionals such as real estate agents and appraisers, to persons not necessarily in 
privity of contract with them. 
Furthermore, Appellant's secured the requisite contractual relationship with 
Appellees to sue under breach of contract theories when the appraisal contract between 
sellers and Appellees was transferred, with full knowledge of Appellees, to Appellants, 
who paid $150.00 for the appraisal. Appellants thus step into the sellers shoes for 
purposes of enforcing their rights. 
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ARGUMENT I 
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE DOES NOT BAR A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION WHERE THE CLAIM IS BASED ON A RECOGNIZED 
DUTY OF CARE INDEPENDENT OF ANY CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
The Trial Court erroneously applied the economic loss doctrine to Appellants here. 
In its memorandum decision, the lower Court concluded as a matter of law that 
Appellants had no cause of action for economic losses caused by negligent 
misrepresentations made by Appellees to Appellants because (1) they were not a party to 
any contract with the Appellees, and (2) there was no physical injury or property damage. 
(R.at 694). In support of its conclusion the Court cites Fennell v. Green, 77 P.3d 339 
(Utah App.2003). Fennell does indeed stand for the aforestated proposition, but in that 
case the defendants were homebuilders and developers whereas in this case the Appellees 
are appraisers. While Appellees argue that the distinction is purely academic and 
irrelevant (R.at 669), upon closer review the distinction is actually dispositive of this case. 
In the Fennell analysis, the court sought to distinguish its holding from two other 
recently decided Utah Supreme Court cases applying the economic loss doctrine. The 
second of those cases, Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002), was specifically 
distinguished by the Fennell court because: " . . . the defendants had an independent duty 
to plaintiffs as real estate professionals." Id. at 343. Therefore, by its own reasoning, the 
Fennell court would have followed the Hermansen precedent if it had found an 
independent duty to the plaintiffs by the defendant homebuilders and developers. 
6 
In stark contrast to, but not inconsistent with, Fennell, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Hermansen laid down the economic loss rule when there is an independent duty of care 
under tort law. The facts in Hermansen are strikingly similar to the case at hand. 
Hermansen, like Appellants, was a purchaser of real estate; while the defendants Tasulis 
and Terena, unlike defendant Green in Fennell, were real estate agents who allegedly 
neglected to inform Hermansen of material facts relating to the purchase of residential 
property. The trial court in Hermansen used the same rationale used by the trial court in 
this case to grant the real estate agents' motion for summary judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and in doing so, shed some light 
on the economic loss doctrine in cases where there is an independent duty of care. The 
Court traced the history of the economic loss doctrine and clearly distinguished between 
the construction industry cases (e.g. the defendants in Fennell) and those cases where the 
defendant is engaged in providing professional services with independent duties of care 
under tort law. The court found two Colorado cases persuasive: 
The proper focus in an analysis under the economic loss rule is on 
the source of the duties alleged to have been breached. Thus, our 
formulation of the economic loss rule is that a party suffering only 
economic loss from breach of express or implied contractual duty 
may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent 
duty of care under tort law. 
Grynberg v. Agric. Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1269 (Colo. 2000). 
We expressly adopt this interpretation of the economic loss rule. 
Therefore, the initial inquiry in cases where the line between contract 
and tort blurs is whether a duty exists independent of any contractual 
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obligations between the parties. When an independent duty exists, 
the economic loss rule does not bar a tort claim "because the claim is 
based on a recognized independent duty of care and thus does not 
fall within the scope of the rule." 
Town of Alma v. Azco Construction, Inc., 10 P.3d at 1256, 1263 (Colo. 2000). See also, 
SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 28 P.3d 669, 682, (Utah 2001); Steiner Corp. v. 
Johnson & Higgins of California, 196 F.R.D. 653, 657-58 (D. Utah 2000); Air Products 
and Chemicals, Inc. v. Eaton Metal Products Co., 272 F. Supp.2d 482, 501 (E.D. PA 
2003) 
Thus, if Appellants can establish that appraisers, like real estate agents, are subject 
to an independent duty of care, the economic loss doctrine will not bar the tort claim of 
negligent misrepresentation. 
ARGUMENT II 
APPELLEES HAVE AN INDEPENDENT DUTY OF CARE TO APPELLANTS 
UNDER TORTLAW 
A. Appellees have an independent duty of care under tort law. 
The Hermansen court specifically found that real estate agents have a duty to deal 
fairly and honestly, despite the fact that the broker is acting primarily as the seller's agent. 
It cited with approval a California case that held that the purposes for imposing a duty to 
disclose accurate or complete information "are to protect the buyer from the unethical 
broker and seller and to insure that the buyer is provided sufficient accurate information 
to make an informed decision whether to purchase." Id. at 24 (citing Easton v. 
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Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90 (1984)). Again similarly to the case at bar, the Easton 
court held that "a real estate broker is a licensed person or entity who holds himself out to 
the public as having particular skills and knowledge in the real estate field. He is under a 
duty to disclose facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which 
are known to him " Id. 
The Court thus concluded that a real estate agent owes an independent duty of care 
to a person with whom he may not be in direct contractual privity. Hermansen at 241. 
The Court also spoke of the real estate agents' added responsibility to insure the 
accuracy of information and warned that. . .'when or if 
the information is given in the capacity of one in the business of 
supplying such information, that care and diligence should be 
exercised which is compatible with the particular business or 
profession involved. Those who deal with such persons do so 
because of the advantages which they expect to derive from this 
special competence. The law, therefore, may well predicate on such a 
relationship, the duty of care to insure the accuracy and validity of 
the information. 
Citing Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utahl983) (quoting 
If. Harper & James, The Law of Torts, §7.6 at 546 (1956)). Furthermore, the court 
added: 
Specific to the duties of a real estate agent to those persons to whom 
the agent owes no fiduciary duty, we stated in Dugan v. Jones that 
"[t]hough not occupying a fiduciary relationship with prospective 
purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the vendor is expected to be 
honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law for his or her 
statutory duty to the public." 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). We 
apply this reasoning and hold that Terena as the real estate agent 
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owed a duty, independent of any implied or express contracts, to be 
"honest, ethical, and competent" in her relationship with the 
Hermansens, although she and Tasulis were hired by the vendor. Id. 
In Utah, the independent recognized duty for professional appraisers is established 
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-27 and the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal 
Practice. Under Rule 1-1 of these standards, in developing a real property appraisal, an 
appraiser must: 
1. Be aware of, understand, and correctly employ those recognized 
methods and techniques that are necessary to produce a credible 
appraisal; 
2. Not commit a substantial error of omission or commission that 
significantly affects an appraisal; (emphasis added) 
3. Not render appraisal services in a careless or negligent manner, such 
as a series of errors that, considered individually, may not 
significantly affect the results of an appraisal, but which, when 
considered in the aggregate, would be misleading. 
The duty for appraisers under this standard is at least equal to if not greater than that 
imposed upon real estate agents. Appellees even admitted in their answer that they have a 
professional duty to act in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice. (R. at 100). 
B. Appellants are part of a class of individuals owed a duty of care by the 
Appellees. 
The trial court was disturbed by the notion that Appellants in this case were 
seeking to impose a duty of care on the defendants which would have included an 
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unlimited duty to the public, which it stated would have required a much broader 
interpretation of relevant law than is reasonably permitted. R. at 694. However, 
Appellants are not seeking such a broad interpretation. Appellants are within a small 
group of individuals who could be expected to rely upon the accuracy of Appellees' 
appraisal in making the decision to purchase a home. Others might include a mortgage 
company or lending institution. 
The authorities cited by Appellants herein are in clear contrast with the trial court's 
rationale, which if upheld would protect appraisers against any action for economic losses 
absent privity of contract or physical or property damage. The Utah Supreme Court 
made it unequivocally clear in Hermansen that the plaintiffs are numbered among those 
who are not barred from filing claims for economic losses based on negligent 
misrepresentation. In fact, three cases from neighboring jurisdictions support the 
proposition that the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation extends beyond those 
in contractual privity with an appraiser and discuss the third parties who may be entitled 
to recover damages. 
The first of these cases, Schaaf v. Highfield, 896 P.2d 665 (Wash. 1995) involved 
an action brought by a home purchaser against a veteran administration-hired appraiser 
alleging negligent appraisal. That court dealt squarely with the issue of whether a real 
estate appraiser owes a duty of care in the preparation of appraisals to third parties who 
are not in contractual privity with the appraiser. The Court held that: 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or 
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employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary 
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused 
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails 
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information. 
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in 
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered 
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose 
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows 
that the recipient intends to supply it; and 
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipients so intends or in 
a substantially similar transaction. Id. At 668. 
It is clear that in this case Appellants are among the limited group of persons for whose 
benefit the information was generated. The Appellants wanted to buy seller's home. The 
Appellees knew that when the appraisal was transferred from the sellers to the 
Appellants, and when the Appellants paid $150.00 for the appraisal. 
The second case, Stotlar v. Hester, 582 P.2d 403 (N.M. 1978), cert, denied, 92 
N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978) also involved a claim for negligent appraisal by a real 
estate purchaser. Noting that there was no privity of contract between Appellants and the 
appraiser, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico cited with approval the following: 
3 Restatement of Torts (Second) s 552 (1977) reads: 
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary 
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused 
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails 
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information. 
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(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in 
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered 
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose 
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows 
that the recipient intends to supply it; and 
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a 
substantially similar transaction. 
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the 
information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons 
for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in 
which it is intended to protect them. 
(I)t is not necessary that the maker should have any particular person 
in mind as the intended, or even the probable, recipient of the 
information. In other words, it is not required that the person who is 
to become the plaintiff be identified or known to the defendant as an 
individual when the information is supplied. It is enough that the 
maker of the representation intends it to reach and influence either a 
particular person or persons, known to him, or a group or class of 
persons, distinct from the much larger class who might reasonably be 
expected sooner or later to have access to the information and 
foreseeably to take some action in reliance upon it. It is enough, 
likewise, that the maker of the representation knows that his 
recipient intends to transmit the information to a similar person, 
persons, or group. It is sufficient, in other words, insofar as the 
plaintiffs identity is concerned, that the maker supplies the 
information for repetition to a certain group or class of persons and 
that the plaintiff proves to be one of them, even though the maker 
never had heard of him by name when t information was given. It is 
not enough that the maker merely knows of the ever present 
possibility of repetition to anyone, and the possibility of action in 
reliance upon it, on the part of anyone to whom it may be repeated. 
Id. At 406. (underline added) 
The final authority is Larsen v. United Federal Savings and Loan of Pes Moines, 
300 N.W. 2d 281 (Iowa 1981). This case has particular relevance to the case at hand 
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because the court reviewed the appraiser's duties in relationship to the purpose of the real 
estate purchase sales transaction. Of particular note was the court's finding that: 
even though the appraisal might be made primarily for the benefit of 
the lending institution, the appraiser should also reasonably expect 
the home purchaser, who pays for the appraisal and to whom the 
results are reported (and who has access to the written report on 
request), will rely on the appraisal to reaffirm his or her belief the 
home is worth the price he or she offered for it. The purchaser of the 
home should be among those entitled to rely on the accuracy of the 
report and therefore should be entitled to sue for damages resulting 
from a negligent appraisal. 
This is especially true when we "take into consideration the end and 
aim of the transaction, . . . . it is undisputed that had the appraisal 
reflected the real market value of the home the loan would have been 
refused and the Larsens could have cancelled or renegotiated their 
contract. Thus, taking the "aim" of the transaction into account, both 
the lending institution and the buyers should be foreseen as users of 
the appraisal report as an important factor in their respective 
decisions to lend money and to borrow money to purchase the home. 
Id. At 287. 
In the case at hand, the record is undisputed that Appellants would not have 
entered into the transaction, nor would the mortgage company have loaned the money to 
the Appellants if the appraisal had reflected the correct square footage and the real market 
value of the home. (R. at 578-579). 
ARGUMENT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
The trial court was in possession of a combination of undisputed facts and 
allegations which, if true, would justify the conclusion that there was a contractual 
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relationship between Appellants and Appellees. While Appellants readily admit that the 
original contract for appraisal services was entered into between the Appellees and the 
sellers of the property, Appellants have submitted documentary evidence and testimony 
clearly demonstrating that the sellers assigned the appraisal contract to the Appellants 
with the express knowledge of the Appellees and the Appellants paid $150.00 for that 
appraisal. (R. at 429). 
Both the Appellees arguments before the trial court and the trial court's 
conclusions do not focus on the privity of the relationship but on the argument that an 
assignee has no greater rights than the assignor. Appellants agree with Appellees' 
citations with respect to the elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract, which 
are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the 
contract by the other party, and (4) damages. Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 38 
P.2d 984 (Utah App. 2001). Appellants have plead and submitted evidence, both 
disputed and undisputed, on all these elements. 
However, Appellants strongly disagree with both the Trial Court and Appellees 
characterization of Appellants rights as an assignee. They argue that assignors have no 
claim for breach of contract because Appellants' Complaint alleges that Appellees' 
breach resulted in a $30,000.00 windfall to the assignors. Absent any damage to 
assignors there is no claim for damages for breach of contract. (R. at 630). This analysis 
works well in third party assignments where the assignee seeks to make the same claims 
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and recover the same amount as assignor. But this is a different scenario. The "windfall" 
to the assignors is a loss to the assignee because the assignor and assignee are the buyer 
and seller in a real estate transaction. A different result is justified in such situations 
where the assignee may stand in the shoes of the assignor for purposes of seeking a 
remedy, but is not barred from recovery because the damages are different than those 
available to the assignor. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants ask this Court to reverse the Trial Court Judge and deny the Appellees' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The evidence is overwhelming that Appellants and 
Appellees were in such a relationship that the Court could find a contractual breach where 
sellers transferred and Appellants purchased the appraisal and that Appellants were 
numbered among those who had a legal right to depend upon the accuracy of the 
appraisal. Since the record is clear that the square footage of the home was overestimated 
by 560 square feet, approximately 18% of its total square footage, it is obvious to the 
average citizen, let alone the professional appraiser, that this has an enormous impact on 
the value of the home and the Appellants deserve to have a jury hear that evidence. 
Nothing in the law cited by Appellees precludes that. On the contrary, Hermansen 
demands that Appellants be given the opportunity to show that they have satisfied the 
requirements for proving negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. 
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Respectfully Submitted t h i s ^ i day of August, 2005 
^ 
KEVIN A. HOWARD 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
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